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Trust, distrust and economic Integration: setting the stage 
 
Ioannis Lianos* and Johannes Le Blanc** 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The concept of integration, the dependent variable of this study, has received 
different interpretations by lawyers, political scientists and economists. Lawyers 
generally understand the concept as referring to “legal integration”, which is defined 
as “the gradual penetration” of EU law “into the domestic law of its member states”1. 
Economists prefer the concept of “economic integration”, defined as “the elimination 
of economic frontiers between two or more economies”2. The removal of trade 
impediments between participating nations and “the establishment of certain 
elements of cooperation and coordination between them” characterizes the process 
of economic integration, as opposed to other forms of international cooperation3. 
Political scientists have been more reluctant to provide a ready-made definition of 
“integration” and have focused their analysis on the “political context in which 
integration occurs”4, the dependent variable being generally conceived in broad and 
descriptive terms, as the transfer of authority to a supranational level5. 
The relatively recent emergence of the concept of “integration”6, owes a lot to 
functionalist theories, which were the first to break away “from the traditional link 
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1
 A.-M. Burley & W. Mattli, ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, 
International Organization, 47 (1) (1993), 41-76, 43. 
2
 J. Pelkmans, ‘The Institutional Economics of European Integration, in Integration Through Law: 
Europe and the American Federal Experience A General Introduction’, in Mauro Cappelletti, Monic 
Seccombe & Joseph Weiler (ed.) Integration Through Law, Vol. 1, Methods, Tools and Institutions, 
Book 1, A Political, Legal and Economic Overview (de Guyter, 1986), p. 318. 
3
 A. M. El-Agraa, Regional Integration- Experience, Theory and Measurement, 2
nd
 ed. (Macmillan, 
1999), p. 1. 
4
 W. Mattli, The Logic Of Regional Integration – Europe and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p. 19. 
5
 See, for instance, W. Mattli, above, p. 1, defining regional integration schemes as “cases that involve 
the voluntary linking in the economic and political domains of two or more formerly independent states 
to the extent that authority over key areas of national policy is shifted towards the supranational level”. 
6
 On the emergence of the theory of international economic integration see, Fritz Machlup, A History of 
Thought on Economic Integration, Macmillan Press, 1977), noting that economists in the inter-war era 
employed the negative noun of “disintegration” of the world economy, probably as a consequence of 
the national protectionist legislation that followed the economic crisis of 1929. The positive noun of 
“integration” was first employed after the Second World War in order to provide a conceptual vehicle 
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between authority and a definite territory by ascribing authority to activities based in 
areas of agreement”7. States exercise several functions (activities), some of which 
require action at the international level. This transfer initiates the process of 
integration, which is driven by the continuous pursuit of these functions, in the context 
of an international institution created to that effect. According to functionalism, 
“(e)very function is left to generate others gradually; in every case the appropriate 
authority is left to grow and develop out of actual performance”8. Based on this 
approach, neo-functionalism was able to construct a theory of regional integration 
employing the model of European integration as the archetypical paradigm of the 
concept. The functionalist approach and the concept of integration are profoundly 
interlinked: without the functionalist emphasis on the existence of separate functions, 
where authority can be transferred, there can be no integration, in the sense political 
scientists give to this term.  
The aim of this chapter is to challenge this view. This can be done, first, by 
showing that the separate-spheres approach, the distinctive characteristic of 
functionalism and of its neo-functionalist progeny, does not hold in the current state 
of the European integration process. As it has been explained elsewhere, we are 
witnessing a gradual transformation from a process of “economic integration” in the 
traditional sense of the word to a “holistic approach”, where economic, social and 
political dimensions are profoundly intertwined9. Secondly, the European 
competences have been expanding continuously to areas previously subjected to the 
exclusive competence of the Member States. It is thus extremely difficult to 
distinguish between the different dimensions and impact of the process of integration 
and the functional boundaries of EU and state competences10. Third, the “legitimacy” 
or democratic deficit critique to the process of European integration has shown the 
limits of breaking the link between authority and territory, and the fact of ascribing 
                                                                                                                                                                       
for the efforts of “integration of the Western European economy”, the substance of which “would be the 
formation of a single large market within which quantitative restrictions on the movements of goods, 
monetary barriers to the flow of payments and, eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept away”: 
Ibid., p. 11, referring to Paul Hoffmann’s official pronouncement to the Council of the Organisation of 
European Economic Co-operation on October 31, 1949 
7
 W. Mattli, The Logic Of Regional Integration – Europe and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p. 21. 
8
 W. Mattli, The Logic Of Regional Integration – Europe and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p. 21-22 referring to the work of David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Quadrangle Books: 
Chicago, 1966). 
9
 I. Lianos, ‘Shifting Narratives in the European Internal Market: Efficient Restrictions of Trade and the 
Nature of “Economic” Integration’, European Business Law Review, 21(5) (2010), 705-760. 
10
 R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism – The Changing Structure of European Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 190-213. 
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authority to activities. However, each process has different implications as to the 
actors involved: while the functionalist logic can accommodate the participation of 
stakeholders in the process (industry, labour, consumers), it is doubtful that it can 
extend to all the affected constituencies, as would have required the principle of 
democratic representation11. 
The shortcomings of the current state of integration theory, including the 
dependent variable selected, will be examined in the first part of this study. Our focus 
will be on the limits of the functionalist logic and on the alternatives suggested by 
competing theories of international relations. We will conclude that the main premises 
of functionalism have been seriously challenged. However, none of the competing 
theories has proposed a new conceptualization of “economic integration” nor have 
they suggested a more precise definition of the dependent variable. This situation is 
unsatisfactory, as without a clear definition of what is entailed by the concept of 
integration, the boundary between regional integration and international economic 
cooperation or other forms of international economic interaction is blurred. 
  Once the need for a new approach on the concept of integration is 
recognized, the second part proceeds in exploring two alternatives. The first one – 
economic integration as efficient organizational creation – perfects the dependent 
variable suggested by functionalism, extending it this time to authority-legitimacy 
transfers and elaborates a sophisticated typology of different degrees of integration. 
The second one – the trust theory of integration – chooses instead to abandon the 
definition of the dependent variable suggested by functionalism and to focus on a 
different dimension that would represent the turn towards a holistic, as opposed to a 
functionalist, approach of integration, where the social, economic and political 
dimensions are embedded to each other. In our view, the trust theory of integration 
provides a promising platform of reflection, not only for the European project of 
integration but for all other projects of regional integration. It can also clearly illustrate 
the important differences, as to the degree of integration, between the European 
integration project, for example, and the World Trade Agreement framework, without, 
however, establishing a clear demarcation line between them.  
 
                                                          
11
 G. Majone, ‘Transaction-cost efficiency and the democratic deficit’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 17(2) (2010), 150-175 noting that the democratic deficit of European integration can be 
explained by the EU leaders propensity to avoid political transaction costs. 
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II. “Economic integration” beyond functionalism  
 
The study of the concept of economic integration post second world war has 
been profoundly linked to the analysis of the phenomenon of regional integration12. 
Heavily inspired by neo-functionalist theory, the studies of regional integration in the  
1950s and 1960s emphasized the different dimensions of the integration process and 
their interaction with each other13.  
The concept of political integration was the main focus, the economic and 
social dimensions of integration being “causally connected with political integration”14. 
Political integration was defined as  
“the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities, towards a 
new centre, whose institution possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states. The end –result of a process of political integration is 
a new political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones”15. 
This framework relied on the following conceptual core: a process of “functional spill-
over” and “political spill-over”, the two being interrelated16. Functional spill-over 
referred to a process of sector integration, starting with low profile economic and 
technical sectors and progressively expanding to the whole economy17. Political spill-
over described “the incremental shifting of expectations, the changing of values and 
the coalescing at the supranational level of national interest groups and political 
parties in response to sectoral integration”18. 
Regional integration could thus be distinguished from international trade 
liberalization, occurring almost during the same period, with the establishment of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Regional economic integration was 
perceived as an exception to the multilateralism of the GATT system, which did not 
                                                          
12
 E. B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: reflections on the joy and anguish of pre-theorizing’, 
International Organization, 24(4) (1970), 607-646. 
13
 J. Nye, ‘Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement’, International Organization, 
22(4) (1968), 855-880, p. 865 and 868, distinguishing between “economic integration” (formation of 
transnational economy), “social integration” (formation of a transnational society) and “political 
integration” (formation of transnational political interdependence). 
14
 E. B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: reflections on the joy and anguish of pre-theorizing’, 
above, p. 632, footnote 31. 
15
 E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16. 
16
 A.-M. Burley & W. Mattli, ‘Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, 
International Organization, 47 (1) (1993), 41-76, p. 55. 
17
 E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, above, p. 297. 
18
 A.-M. Burley & W. Mattli, “Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration”, above, 
p. 55. 
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include any preferential regime at the time of its conclusion19. Only, Article XXIV of 
GATT contained an exception to the most favored nation (MFN) principle of Article I  
GATT, thus preventing multilateralism from operating in the specific setting of 
regional integration. The mechanism of spill-over, the constitution of supra-national 
institutions where experts, rather than diplomats, played a central role, was largely 
absent from the GATT scheme, whose nature was purely inter-governmental. 
The topic of this volume being the regulation of trade in services at the 
regional (EU) and international (WTO) level, it is important to examine the basic 
tenets of neo-functionalism, before moving to other approaches that have challenged 
its assumptions. Our aim is to uncover the theoretical underpinnings of “economic 
integration”, by looking to the actors involved, as these are defined by each 
theoretical framework, their motivations or their ways of operation.  
 
A. The rise and the fall of neo-functionalism 
 
 Neo-functionalism’s starting point is social differentiation: society is carved in 
various specialized and autonomous sectors, operating independently but gradually 
in more intensive cooperation with each other, as a consequence of the spill-over 
effect. Technocratic economic issues are perceived separately from contentious 
political or social ones. At the same time, they are profoundly interlinked within the 
same continuum. According to Haas, the initiator of the theory, “the supranational 
style stresses the indirect penetration of the political by way of economic because the 
‘purely’ economic decisions always acquire political significance in the minds of the 
participants”20. At the same time, “the measure of political success inherent in 
economic integration lies in the demands, expectations and loyalties of the political 
actors affected by the process, which do not logically and necessarily follow from 
statistical indices of economic success”21. It is clear in neo-functionalist theory that a 
“purely” economic scheme “does not by itself answer the basic political question 
                                                          
19
 Article XXIV of GATT illustrates that regional integration was perceived as an exception to 
multilateralism. Preferential regimes were introduced in the GATT system with the Enabling Clause in 
1979. See, GATT BISD 26S 1980, 203-205. 
20
 E.B. Haas, “Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe”, in in. Joseph S. Nye, ed., International 
Regionalism: A Reader (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 149-166, p. 152. 
21
 E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, above., p. 13. 
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whether the unified economy meets with the satisfaction of people active within it”22. 
The political and the economic dimension of integration are profoundly interlinked. 
The main actors in the process of integration are experts operating 
independently from their national political constituents but who are at the same time 
checked by “equally prescient national actors”23. They aim to promote, first, sectoral 
economic integration and, following “spill-over”, other forms of integration. The 
process of decision-making is incremental.24. 
The dependent variable of integration is the concept of “authority-legitimacy 
transfer or sharing”25. Possible independent variables are institutionalization and the 
attitudes of actors26. Remarkably, neo-functionalism does not focus on the flow of 
goods, services, people across Member States as independent variables of 
integration27. The dependent variable chosen is, of course, highly general and 
moving; hence, it does not relate to the existence of a holistic end-state or terminal 
condition: that of the “amalgamated” variety, such as the federal union, or of the 
“pluralistic” variety, such as a confederation. Domestic politics, the different 
dimensions of integration (economic, political and social) and the perception of States 
as multiple actors, active in the global as well as in the regional sphere, provide the 
matrix of the process of integration. 
Although not necessarily limited to the study of European regional 
integration28, the process of European integration has profoundly influenced neo-
functionalism. Eventually, the credibility of the theory was affected by its perceived 
inability to explain the difficulties faced by the European project in the 1970s29, 
following the “chaire vide” crisis and the opposition of General de Gaulle to British 
accession. The increasing role of “national actors” challenged the neo-functionalist’s 
belief that the integrated institutions were able to cope with the spill-over effect and 
                                                          
22
 Ibid., p. 284. 
23
 E.B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration – Reflections on the joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing’, International Organization, 24(4) (1970), 607-646, p. 627. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid., p. 633. 
26
 Ibid., p. 636. 
27
 Ibid., p. 610, “(t)he study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states 
cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their 
neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for 
resolving conflict between themselves”. See also, Ibid., p. 628. 
28
 See, for a study of Haas’ influence on the study of Latin American integration, W. Mattli, ‘Ernst 
Haas’s evolving thinking on comparative regional integration of virtues and infelicities’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 12(2) (2005), 327-348. 
29
 E.B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Institute of International Studies: 
University of California, Berkeley, 1975). 
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consequently the possible “collapse of legitimacy”, caused by the absence of a clear 
central authority able to cope with “complexly linked and highly controversial issues in 
the European agenda”30. Following this crisis, the process of integration seemed to 
arrive to a stalemate, thus questioning the predictions of neo-functionalist theory.  
At this point, a new “heroic actor”, which remained ignored so far by neo-
functionalist theory, made its entrance: the European Court of Justice (now Court of 
Justice of the EU)31. The Court initiated a “constitutional framework for a federal type 
structure in Europe32”, by developing the building blocks of European 
constitutionalism (direct effect, supremacy, general principles and protection of 
fundamental rights). Away from the conceptual fuzziness of neo-functionalism, where 
no clear indication was given on the dependent variable of integration33, the Court of 
Justice’s rhetoric of legal coherence, “effet utile” as well as its federal understanding 
of the relation between the centre and the periphery provided a clear view of what the 
process of integration entailed. An additional advantage of the Court was that its 
legal-technical rhetoric was largely immunized by the risks of political spill-over and 
the reaction of national actors. Indeed, the Court had previously taken care to ally 
national judges to its cause, by empowering them to act independently from their 
domestic executive and, to a certain extent, legislative powers and to move away, in 
matters of European law, from their limited interpretative margin in civil law 
jurisdictions. Teleological interpretation became akin to “functional spill-over”, without 
its political inconvenience, so to speak. 
The emergence of the Court as the principal actor in the integration process 
had profound implications on the type of dominant rationality that emerged. This was 
economically oriented towards the constitution of a “Single market” but heavily relied 
on a legalistic approach, the content of which was progressively defined by the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ. Legal integration, “the gradual penetration of (EU) law into 
the domestic law of its member states”34, was examined exclusively from a legal 
                                                          
30
 E.B, Haas, ‘Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration’, International Organization, 
30(2) (1976), 173-212. 
31
 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, Yale L. J., 100  (1991), 2403-2483, 2409. 
32
 E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’, American Journal of 
International Law, 75 (1981), 1-27, p. 1. 
33
 See, E.B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration – Reflections on the joy and Anguish of Pre-
theorizing’, International Organization, 24(4) (1970), 607-646, p. 628, admitting that “neo-functionalists 
do not agree on a dependent variable and therefore differ with each other on the point in time at which 
a judgment of how much successful integration is to be made”. 
34
 A.-M. Burley & W. Mattli, ‘Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, above, p. 
43. 
 10 
 
coherence perspective, with little emphasis given to external (to the legal system) 
sources of rationality35. Theoretical perspectives advocating an “integration through 
law” approach adopted a more contextual perspective but still fell short of providing 
an overall conceptual framework that would explain the process of European 
integration36. 
To cite an example, the broad definition of measures equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions adopted by the Court (in what is now Article 34 TFEU), the Member 
States incurring the burden to prove that the restriction of trade is justified by public 
interest objectives, can be explained by a specific conception of economic integration 
emphasizing regulatory uniformity across Member States or the absence of national 
trade barriers to the operation of the “single market”. From this perspective, the 
position of the Court can be compared to neo-functionalism, where spill-over leads 
inevitably to full economic unity37. Yet, it is important to note that neo-functionalists 
did not equate economic integration to regulatory sameness, but emphasized instead 
the progressive transfer of demands, expectations and loyalties of the political and 
economic actors to a new centre38. The Commission saw the opportunities offered by 
a broad definition of the concept of trade restriction and rushed to interpret the 
Court’s jurisprudence as reinforcing its own powers39. 
 The legalistic approach followed by the Court led to a disconnection between 
the legal/narrow economic integration and its broader political and social dimensions. 
This is particularly apparent if one adopts a narrow definition of “legal integration” or 
“integration through law”, accounting for a positivistic understanding, where law is 
hard and involves sanctions, in case of non-compliance. In contrast to the purely 
economic dimension, the social dimension of integration has been notoriously left 
outside. Yet a broader understanding that would emphasize social practice and that 
would involve additional actors than courts40, may provide a slightly different account 
of the evolution of European integration and the emergence of social regulation at the 
                                                          
35
 K. Kaiser, ‘L’ Europe des Savants – European Integration and the Social Sciences’, JCMS, (1965) 
4(1), 36-46, pp. 39-40. 
36
 A.-M. Burley & W. Mattli, “Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration”, above, 
pp. 46-48. 
37
 E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, above, p. 283. 
38
 Ibid., p. 13. 
39
 Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences of the judgment given by the 
Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1980] OJ C-256/2. 
40
 G. de Búrca, ‘Rethinking law in neofunctionalist theory’, JEPP, 12(2) (2005), 310-326, p. 318. 
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EU level41. The open method of coordination and other new methods of governance 
are the means through which the social dimension has been introduced in the 
economic integration project. The social dimension is now hardening with the 
development of a legislative programme that allegedly takes stock of the 
embeddedness of the economic and the social dimensions42. This leads to a more 
holistic approach towards the Internal Market project43, which inevitably challenges 
the role of experts, the “heroes” of integration for neo-functionalists, and re-
emphasizes the role of national political actors in the process. The role of the latter 
has been the focus of realists/neo-realists approaches. 
 
B. Realist and neo-realist approaches: the return to national actors 
 
The resurgence of realism, after the perceived failure of neo-functionalism to 
explain the role of national actors in the integration process had important effects on 
the binary opposition between the European and the national levels that underpinned 
neo-functionalism. Moving away from this opposition, the realist view perceives the 
process of European integration as a “rescue” of the Nation State44. The theory 
insists on the complex bargaining between different States and the opportunity of 
side-payments as the driving forces of integration. In the realist’s worldview, the 
European integration is a multi-level system of actors with different preferences 
aiming to the preservation of their sovereignty. The supra-national institutions, such 
as the European Commission or the Court, are secondary actors that intervene to 
mobilize coalition of governments for specific projects45, for instance the 
establishment of the Common Market46.  While neo-functionalists stress the 
supranational authorities and international expert’s role in promoting integration, a 
realist perspective on European integration focuses on the role of States. 
                                                          
41
 D. Ashiagbor, The European Employment Strategy: Labour Market Regulation and New 
Governance. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
42
 M. Monti, ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market at the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society’, 
Report to the President of the European Commission, 9 May 2010; Communication from the European 
Commission, “A Single Market for the 21st Century”, Brussels, 20 November 2007 COM(2007) 724 
final. 
43
 I. Lianos, ‘Shifting Narratives in the European Internal Market: Efficient Restrictions of Trade and the 
Nature of “Economic” Integration’, above.. 
44
 A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, 2
nd
 ed. (Routledge: London & New York, 
2000), p. 4. 
45
 D. Puchala, ‘Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonization in the European Communities’, World 
Politics, 27(4) (1975), 496-520. 
46
 W. Sandholtz & J. Zysman, ‘1992: Recasting the European Bargain’, World Politics, 42 (1989), 95-
128. 
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According to realists, the international system is characterized by anarchy and 
the relations between States are governed by the “law of the jungle47.” Nation-states, 
not international organizations or transnational organizations, are the primary actors 
in this system48. Every State has to take care of its interests by itself. Vital interests 
for a State are the protection of its territory and the independence in its political 
decision-making from external powers, which might also relate to economic 
capabilities and its ability to deal effectively with poverty, diseases, natural disasters 
and other threats49.  
For realists, an increase of resources and capabilities by one State creates a 
dilemma for all members of the system and is easily perceived as a threat by its 
neighbors, which thereupon increase their own capabilities. The result is a never 
ending struggle for power50. The most powerful states resulting from this rivalry for 
might are of course the most relevant ones in the international system. These 
dominant powers, the “hegemons”51, organize weaker states and enforce peace 
among them. This constellation lasts until the tide turns and formerly weak states 
may increase their might, finally challenging the hegemon. International organizations 
are only seen as a mere instrument by which powerful States attempt to defend and 
advance their national interests52.  
International cooperation is possible as long as it leads to gains for the States 
involved. Realists agree that cooperation is more feasible when:  
``[…] large transactions can be divided up into a series of smaller ones, if 
transparency can be increased, if both the gains from cheating and the costs 
of being cheated on are relatively low, if mutual cooperation is or can be made 
much more advantageous than mutual defection, and if each side employs 
                                                          
47
 R. Aron. ‘The Anarchical Order of Power’, Daedalus, 95(2) (1966), 479–502, at 480 
48
 J. H. Herz. ‘Political Realism Revisited’ International Studies Quarterly, 25(2) (1981), 182–197, at 
183 
49
 S. M. Walt. The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly, 35(2) (1991), 
211–239, p 213;  R. Niebuhr. Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner´s Sons, 
1947), p 15 
50
 John H. Herz. Political Realism Revisited. International Studies Quarterly, 25(2) (1981), 182–197. 
51
 Hegemony relation is according to John H. Herz. Political Ideas and Political Reality. The Western 
Political Quarterly, 3(2) (1950), 161–178, p 167, are constellation in which “[…] one or a few of the 
members of sectional interests concerned "leads" the others.” 
52
 H. J. Morgenthau, ‘The Yardstick of National Interest’, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 296 (1954), 77–84. 
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strategies of reciprocity and believes that the interactions will continue over a 
long period of time53.’’  
Diplomats play a key role in negotiations over cooperation. Their task is to 
mitigate the States’ concerns and to increase the gains from cooperation. States will 
be more inclined to cooperate the better they understand the behavior of their 
opponents. Open exchange of information and the creation of transparency of the 
domestic processes are key factors for successful cooperation among States. An 
alternative strategy of a State fearing a potential turnaround of a current partner in 
the future is to integrate the opponent and itself into a cooperative structure in order 
to reduce the incentives of reneging in the future54.  
Neo-realists share the realist view on the unimportance of international 
organizations and other sub-national actors. They leave no doubt that it is the State 
and by no means other organizations that are capable of performing all crucial social, 
economic and security functions that nation-states need in order to survive55. 
International organizations56 are in neo-realist thought merely instruments by which 
powerful States realize their interests. These institutions have only limited 
independent effects since they are created, shaped and kept alive by States. The 
survival of international organizations therefore reflects more the power and influence 
of major States than the independent power of institutions themselves57.  
The establishment of cooperation among States is seen in neo-realism as 
highly difficult and restricted by the States struggle about the distribution of gains 
from cooperation58. Due to their preoccupation with their own relative position in the 
international system, the main objective of States is not the maximization of their 
gains from interaction but the prevention of other States from increasing their 
                                                          
53
 R. Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate’, International 
Security, 24(1) (1999), 42–63, at 52. 
54
 R. Jervis, ‘Realism in the Study of World Politics’, International Organization, 52(4) (1998), 971–991, 
at 986-987. 
55
 K. N. Waltz. ‘Globalization and Governance’, Political Science and Politics, 32(4) (1999), 693–700, 
at 697;  K. N. Waltz. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(1) (2000), 5–41, 
p. 18 
56
 R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye. Power and Interdependence, 2nd (ed.) (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1989), p 54. 
57
 S. D. Krasner, ‘Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier’, World 
Politics, 43(3) (1991), 336–366; J. J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, 
International Security, 19(3) (1995), 5–49, p. 13;  K. N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, 
International Security, 25(1) (2000), 5–41, p. 20 
58
 K. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p 105. 
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capabilities relative to their own ones. States will therefore defect from cooperation as 
soon as they perceive the relative gains of partners are exceeding their own59. 
Alliances are possible, but only under specific circumstances. They are 
feasible in a multi-polar system in which States interact closely in order to balance a 
major State or another alliance of States. In such a setting, each State is vitally 
dependent on the other and the defection of one member would jeopardize the 
security of all the other members of the alliance. The situation changes somewhat in 
a bipolar environment in which two major powers provide most of the security. 
Defections of minor partners in this case have only minor impact upon the alliance as 
a whole. Since States find themselves in a self-help system in which each unit is 
required to look after itself, the most likely constellation that results is a balance of 
power. This is a direct consequence of the nature of the system itself and is most 
likely to perpetuate as long as at least some States try to preserve themselves60. But 
the international system is by no means static. It is a dynamic system in which 
“structures shape and shove; they encourage States to do some things and to refrain 
from doing others”61. As a result, States permanently have to reconsider their own 
position relative to other States. This constant dynamic change “stimulates States to 
behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power”62. The problem of 
a self-help system can be overcome in a situation of hegemony of one powerful state 
which will prevent other States from defecting from negotiated conditions and, more 
generally, will regulate interaction among States63.  
 This theory of international relations has important implications on the 
theorizing of European integration.  
First, the realist and neo-realist turn in international relations has shifted the focus 
of integration theory towards domestic interests and interstate bargaining, that is, 
domestic politics, rather than structural factors such as the position of the State in the 
international power distribution. The realist view questions the role of transnational 
elites or experts in the process of “integration” and emphasizes instead the 
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differences that exist between States and the subsequent regulatory pluralism that 
reflects their very different domestic political structures64. Integration is not automatic; 
it can be perceived instead as a form of instable cooperation and inter-governmental 
bargaining between sovereign States, each following its own fixed preferences. To 
the integrationist logic of neo-functionalists, one could thus oppose the “state-centred 
pluralistic and structured” approach of realists/neo-realists65.  
Secondly, in the realist/neo-realist tradition, the aim pursued by international 
organizations is to reduce the transaction costs emanating from the interaction 
between States. For neo-realists, States face two options in order to ensure their 
security: bandwagoning and balancing. Bandwagoning is the strategy of choice for 
weak states which are unable to balance against their stronger neighbors. Instead of 
increasing their own capabilities they seek protection by strong States in exchange of 
important opportunities of “voice” within the organization66. Stronger State entities 
choose the balancing strategy67.  The continuity between the technical/economic and 
the political dimensions of integration through the operation of the spill-over effect 
could thus be questioned68. In this tradition, the “progress” of European integration is 
not due to a spill-over effect but constitutes an epiphenomenon of the emergence of 
the hegemonic power of the United States, which pushed the medium and declining 
Western European powers to a strategy of “balancing” by constituting the European 
Communities69. 
 Thirdly, these approaches presuppose a strong entanglement between 
domestic and international politics, the latter influencing the formation of national 
preferences70. One could employ the analogy of two-level games, where processes 
occurring in the international level (high politics) influence considerably domestic 
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politics and the formation of preferences at the national level (low politics)71. The 
inverse syllogism is also true: domestic politics and economic interests largely 
explain national preferences represented at the international level72. For example, 
States delegate powers to international organizations with the aim to strengthen the 
authority of the executive branch, in particular as many of the domestic political 
constraints may not affect the international level73. Delegations of authority to 
international organizations become thus largely compatible with neo-realists theories. 
For comparison, neo-functionalists would have emphasized the technical nature of 
decision-making in certain international cooperation settings, which would have 
required delegation to international experts and consequently the development of 
technocratic consensus. 
 The role of States being reaffirmed, it became difficult for neo-functionalists to 
argue that experts and/or the “heroic” Court were running the show. However, the 
progress of economic integration post Single European Act could not be adequately 
explained by the realist/neo-realist perspective as well, despite the best efforts made 
by some commentators74. The theory of federalism offers an alternative perspective. 
 
C. Federalism 
 
 The federalist view highlights the transfer of authority and competences from 
the State level to the federal level as an important indication of integration75. Only 
significant transfers of sovereignty count. Federalism may take different forms: dual 
federalism is based on the idea that the federal level and the State have equal 
sovereignty (they are “co-equals”) and they exercise mutually exclusive competences 
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in their own spheres; cooperative federalism supposes power sharing between the 
federal and the State level in order to provide solutions to social problems76. This 
definition assumes that cooperative federalism lends itself to hierarchy, while dual 
federalism to heterarchy. Such dichotomy may seem, however, simplistic and does 
not exhaust the different meanings of the concept of federalism. Indeed, some 
authors have advocated a “federal vision beyond the state”, “articulated around the 
concepts of mutual tolerance and empowerment”77. Kalypso Nicolaidis notes that the 
distinguishing feature of “federalism” 
“[…] lies precisely in not resolving the tensions which exist between the two poles: 
the One and the Many. In a federation, each part is itself a whole, not a part of a 
whole, and the whole itself is more than its parts. Neither is the One a simple 
expression of the Many—collaboration—nor are the Many simply components of 
the One—hierarchy. Instead, like fractals in our mental and material maps, each 
exhibits in its own scale its own version of a familiar pattern; each level operates 
as a whole albeit with multiple and subtle connections with other levels. 
Federalism in its essence does not mean bringing together different polities as 
one—however decentralized—polity. It means instead retaining what is separate 
in spite of all that is common”78. 
This “federal vision” is characterized by a shift to “open ended dynamics”, “shared 
competences” (including their exercise) arranged around principles of “networked 
cooperation” and proportionality, the emergence of “power checks” through “mutual 
control” and “federalism safeguards”, the turn to “multi-centred governance” achieved 
through “non-hierarchical models of governance”, the respect of principles of 
“constitutional tolerance”, mutual recognition and more broadly the existence of 
shared identities79. Nicolaidis observes,  
“(t)his implies inter alia a shift in focus in the competence debate away from 
allocation of competences per se towards granting centre stage to the 
processes of change themselves and the mechanisms that make them 
sustainable, including governance structures and the many mechanisms of 
control among the actors involved at different levels, democratic input in the 
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joint management of shared competences, and strategies of mutual 
empowerment between levels and actors involved in governance. In the end, it 
calls for a move ‘beyond hierarchy’ from vertical paradigms of multi-layered 
governance to more horizontal ones of multi-centred governance where the 
legitimacy of the system as a whole is grounded in mutual tolerance, mutual 
recognition, and mutual empowerment rather than in the design of common 
structures and the pursuit of homogenous practices”80. 
This conceptualization has important implications on the concept of integration: 
“Integration can be more about sustainable decentralization than 
centralization, horizontal mutual inclusiveness rather than vertical delegation 
of authority, and managing differences rather than engineering 
convergence”81. 
 The “federal vision” breaks with the uni-dimensional view of “legal integration” 
and the latter’s focus on regulatory sameness. Regulatory pluralism becomes 
essential in order to provide the necessary degree of flexibility, political inclusiveness 
and empowerment to the individual parts forming the “federal” unit. Although, this 
“federal vision” may be relevant, if not applicable, to governance at the world level, 
the main thrust of the theory focuses, as it was the case for neo-functionalism, on the 
European experiment of regional integration and looks unlikely to be applied as such 
at the WTO level. 
 
D. Liberal regime theory (institutionalism and governance theory) 
 
 The narrow conceptual focus of “legal integration” is also at odds with the 
recent emphasis on the study of “institutions” and “governance”.  The positive 
influence of institutions, in particular in overcoming the problems arising from an 
anarchic international system, is the core subject of “liberal institutionalism”. Liberal 
approaches differ from the realist school in that they reject the idea of States as the 
most important actors in international relations. The main premises of this theory are 
that States are not understood as unitary or rational agents; power is pushed into the 
background by economic interests; and international institutions are believed to 
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promote cooperation among States82. The liberal schools of thought, as the realist 
ones, do not represent a homogeneous theory but consist of several approaches, 
each one contributing to the understanding of the nature of inter-state relations83.  
The study of international institutions and organizations becomes even more 
central in neo-liberal institutionalism (neoliberals). Although in agreement with the 
core assumptions of neo-realism, which regards States as the most important actors 
pursuing their own interests, assumes rational behavior by the actors and notes the 
anarchical character of the international system, neoliberals believe that cooperation 
between states is possible84. Since cooperation does not arise automatically, as it 
always remains overshadowed by the fear of cheating, transaction costs may rise 
and the returns from the interaction are uncertain, institutions play a central role85. 
Institutions can “reduce the uncertainty about the reliability of other States and, once 
in place, they lower the costs of securing specific agreement86”.  
However, States are not perceived as unitary actors. Both the national and 
international levels impact on decision-making in international relations87. Multiple 
channels link societies. Not only do official interstate relations count but also trans-
governmental and trans-national relations. These relations lead to strong 
transnational ties with high transaction rates, making States or sub-national actors in 
different countries economically dependent on one another. In contrast to 
interconnectedness, interdependence is always related to symmetric or asymmetric 
“costly effects of transactions”, since it restricts autonomy. The asymmetries in 
dependence allow an actor to influence the counterparts he is interacting with88. 
There are two dimensions of interdependence: sensitivity and vulnerability. In a 
stable framework, sensitivity refers to “degrees of responsiveness within a policy 
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framework - how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, 
and how great are the costly effects89?” Sensitivity of interdependence describes the 
costs that an actor has to bear if no action is taken in response. Vulnerability, 
however, “rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that 
various actors face90”. The dimension of vulnerability stands for the costs that the 
actor faces by adapting to the changes.      
This complex interdependence has important implications on political 
processes. First, States are most likely to use asymmetrical interdependence, 
international organizations and transnational actors to attain their goals. Secondly, 
under complex interdependence there is no difference between high and low politics. 
This leads to a situation in which “[d]iscontented domestic groups will politicize issues 
and force more issues once considered domestic onto the interstate agenda”91. 
Thirdly, multiple channels of contacts among societies form and exercise strong 
influence “on the ability of statesmen to calculate the manipulation of 
interdependence or follow a consistent strategy of linkage92”. Numerous non-state 
actors, as well as state bureaucracies interact permanently across borders. Fourthly, 
international organizations and institutions grow more important. Institutions can help 
“set up the international agenda, and act as catalysts for coalition-formation and as 
arenas for political initiatives and linkage by weak states”93. By congregating 
representatives of different actors, international organizations can initiate coalitions of 
interest. In particular, weak states profit from their equal participation in organizations 
which provide these states with a forum for dialogue and cooperation.   
The consequence of interdependence for political strategy is that the activities 
of all actors in the international system cause costs that other actors have to bear. 
Those actors, affected by the activities of others, will try to avoid having the burdens 
of adjustment forced upon them. The challenge is to “generate and maintain a 
mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation in the face of competing efforts by 
governments (and nongovernmental actors) to manipulate the system for their own 
benefit94”.        
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Closely intertwined with interdependence is the concept of “regimes”. Regime 
theory is a reaction to and at the same time a correction of the theory of hegemonic 
stability of the realist school95. According to Keohane and Nye,  
“relationships of interdependence often occur within, and may be affected by, 
networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control 
its effects. We refer to the sets of governing arrangements that affect 
relationships of interdependence as international regimes96.” 
The authors portray regimes as an important alternative tool to facilitate interaction 
among States. In the absence of authoritative institutions and therefore “pervasive 
uncertainty” in the international system, regimes facilitate creating mutually 
advantageous agreements among several actors where ad hoc interaction would 
yield less efficient results97. Specific sets of regulations and procedures are 
developed to coordinate the interaction of States and transnational actors in multiple 
areas. Regimes order international behavior and reduce conflict in the international 
system, they empower new groups to fight for their cause, they may increase the 
acknowledgement of common interests and they might initiate new policies98. While 
acknowledging the anarchical structure of the international system, neo-liberals claim 
that its negative effects can, at least partly, be overcome by this instrument99.  
Regimes come in profoundly different shapes. They can either be formal or 
informal and can even be incorporated in interstate agreements and treaties. 
Keohane and Nye differentiate between “structure” and “process”: while structures 
focus on the distribution of capabilities among states, process refers to bargaining 
behavior within a power structure. Regimes take an intermediate position between 
the international power structures and the bargaining processes among the players, 
that is, on the one hand, the regime is profoundly shaped by the distribution of power 
in the system, while, on the other hand, it has impact on the bargaining process 
inside the system100.  
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Regimes are formed by States to diminish risks and conflicts of interest by 
coordinating the behavior of actors101. They might also increase the efficiency of 
interstate transactions by making agreement easier as they provide frameworks for 
establishing legal liability, “they improve the quantity and quality of information 
available to actors” or they reduce other transaction costs, such as costs of 
organization or of making side-payments102.   
Regimes are set up when organizational costs are lower than the expected 
return from the cooperation. The costs of setting up a regime need to be weighted to 
the costs of ad hoc decisions. If the latter is higher, the likelihood of the establishment 
of a regime is high. This is most likely to happen in environments where the “issue 
density” is high, that is, in policy spaces where a high number of important issues 
arise103.  Making agreements on certain issues in dense policy spaces tends to have 
a spill-over effect on neighboring issues, because of the subsequent economies in 
organizational costs involved in reconciling distinct objectives. Regimes bringing 
together actors to discuss a wide range of issues also have a side effect in the form 
of side-payments. While side-payments usually raise transaction costs, these might 
be lowered by regimes because “[…] expectations that an integration arrangement 
can be expanded to new issue-areas permit the broadening of potential side-
payments, thus facilitating agreements”104.  
The central idea of regime functioning is that repeated interaction between 
states makes it possible to surmount the uncertainties arising from the prisoners 
dilemma105. The “shadow of the future” allows for a continuous interaction among 
players in an anarchical environment106. Assuming that players not only take short, 
but also long term benefits into account in an indefinitely repeated interaction, 
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permanent cooperation without an enforcing power is possible even among egoistic 
actors107.  However,  
“(f)or cooperation to prove stable, the future must have a sufficiently large 
shadow. This means that the importance of the next encounter between the 
same two individuals must be great enough to make defection an unprofitable 
strategy108.” 
The prospect of future interaction is not, however, the only element 
determining cooperation. According to the “sanctioning problem”, the number of 
players in the game and their stance towards each other also matters. Three 
conditions decide whether an interaction is effective: “(1) players can identify 
defectors; (2) they are able to focus retaliation on defectors, and (3) they have 
sufficient long-run incentives to punish defectors”109. The higher the number of 
actors, the harder it gets to fulfill all three conditions; the incentive for free-riding 
increases. The stronger the sanctioning problem, the more likely it is that cooperation 
among the actors will break down. A possible scenario in which this problem may be 
overcome is when one powerful actor takes the initiative and rebuilds the system in a 
way that sanctions become possible110.  
In regime theory, neo-liberalism’s stance towards the importance of the 
presence of a powerful hegemon to facilitate cooperation comes to light. Regimes, it 
is argued, can supplement a powerful player as a facilitator of cooperation among 
states. The positive effects of a regime hold even in the absence of a hegemon. It is 
therefore possible to create and maintain such institutions among comparably strong 
States111. To be sure, this does not mean that hegemony is antagonistic to regimes. 
The two models are often found in symbiotic relationship with one another. 
Hegemony in the context of regimes stands for a specific pattern of “asymmetrical 
cooperation, which successful hegemons support and maintain”112. What appears to 
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be a convergence of neo-realist and neo-liberalist theory is, in reality, a profoundly 
different perspective on hegemony and cooperation. The hegemon has to invest in 
the establishment and maintenance of institutions in order to make sure that those 
rules and norms are followed by other countries113.  
 
E. Conclusions 
 
Starting from similar assumptions about the nature of the international system, 
liberals and neo-liberals come to surprisingly different conclusions than their neo-
realist counterparts. In contrast to realist thinking, liberals assume that actors, out of 
self interest, interact closely and realize common interests. By interacting in regimes 
they develop trust over time, although cheating is always a viable option114. By taking 
more actors, a wider time horizon, multiple channels of interaction and an increasing 
relationship of interdependence into account, (neo-)liberalism provides a highly 
complex and useful approach for the understanding of the relations among States 
and other actors. The theory assumes that in order to realize their shared interest, 
States interact closely, form institutions to reduce transaction costs, and by 
cooperating permanently under the “shadow of the future”, establish international 
regimes (of economic integration). The realist perspective in which power determines 
all interaction among States appears reductionist from this point of view since it 
ignores the complexity of inter- and transnational connections among them. Several 
aspects remain, however, disputed. In particular, neo-realists argue that institutions, 
regardless of how well they interconnect actors, do not solve the threat of cheating 
and the concerns over higher relative gains of the other States involved115.   
In conclusion, one could distinguish between approaches that recognize the 
specificity of the regional integration phenomenon, considered as sui generis to other 
forms of cooperation between States, from approaches that can easily be transposed 
to the global context. Neo-functionalism and federalism seem appropriate candidates 
for the first type, as they both pre-suppose the development of common 
understandings and shared meanings between elites of experts (neo-functionalism) 
or governments (federalism). On the contrary, realist/neorealist approaches and 
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liberal institutionalism or regime theories emphasize external factors to the individual 
motives of the actors involved, such as the nature and occurrence of the 
transactions, the development of interdependence or competition between the 
different States and the interests they represent. 
These intellectual perspectives set important challenges to the traditional concept 
of “economic integration”. Integration cannot refer simply to an erosion of regulatory 
differences by the application of negative integration rules prohibiting national 
regulations or the European (federal) harmonization of national regulatory standards, 
as it was thought by the “legal integration” approach. As previously explained, the 
“legal integration” approach does not transpose the full complexity of the integration 
phenomenon. This is recognized by all the different approaches examined in the 
previous paragraphs, including the neo-functionalist one which, at the difference of 
the “legal integration” approach that partially emanates from it, emphasizes the 
political as well as the social dimension of integration. 
Once the “legal integration” view is rejected, it is difficult, however, to find an 
answer to the question of what is entailed by the concept of economic integration. A 
possible way out is provided by the contextual framework of the “integration through 
law” perspective: integration constitutes the transfer of legitimacy or authority across 
different political entities. The approach collapses the concepts of political and 
economic integration to “a reciprocal relationship between the legal and political 
spheres” of European integration116; Yet, as Burley and Mattli observe these 
approaches 
“suffer generally from two problems: first, the nature of the relationship is often 
fuzzy and claims of cause and effect are qualified so as to be rendered almost 
empty. Second, the incentives for action are not spelled out”117. 
One could also add the relative small importance granted by these theories to soft 
law, the bulk of the literature being on the role of the courts and legislative 
harmonization. In other words, the problem we suddenly face is the same that the 
one Haas identified as the main concern for “pre-theories” of regional integration: 
what is the dependable variable that we are trying to explain? Is this always the one 
Haas once identified: the “transfer of legitimacy-authority”? How this could be 
operationalized in the context of the different approaches examined in this study? 
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What would be the measure of success of “integration” if one adopts a more holistic 
perspective than that of “legal integration”, one that accepts regulatory pluralism and 
diversity? 
 In the next section, we will provide two alternative accounts of the concept of 
integration that may accommodate the recent turn to a holistic view of economic 
integration and the increasing role of soft law norms in the integration process. 
 
II. Two views on economic integration: efficient organizational creation and 
increasing levels of trust 
 
 Whatever theory of international relations one is adopting; it is clear that for all 
of them the dependent variable of integration is the same. This is because the 
theories attempt to explain why integration happens but are relatively silent, to the 
exception of neo-functionalists, on the dependent variable of integration as well as on 
the independent variables one should take into account in order to identify and 
measure the degree of integration. In his seminal contribution on The Study of 
Regional Integration Haas noted the existence of two competing “pre-theories” of 
integration to neo-functionalism, each focusing on different variables: the federal 
approach assumed the transferability of the unitary framework of the State from the 
national to the regional level (the beyond-the-state version of federalism was not 
represented at the time); the communications approach focused on the relations 
between groups of people and the existence of important rates of transaction as 
measured by trade, mail and tourist flow indicators and by the rate of supranational 
group formations118. Each of the approaches proffered its own dependent variables: 
the federalist approach was the least ambiguous, the achievement of a federal union 
among the units studied being its “terminal condition”119. Nonetheless, such an end-
state is highly improbable in the context of international economic relations and, as 
we have explained, varies, according to the type of federalism adopted (dual 
federalism, cooperative federalism, the “federal vision”) 
 The question of the dependent variable of integration remaining unresolved, it 
is important to examine possible alternatives to the “master concept” of “authority-
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legitimacy transfer” leading to different types of “terminal condition120. For Haas, 
“institutionalization” constituted an indicator for authority and legitimacy121. We will 
take this as the starting point of our quest for a dependent variable. A first option is to 
focus more precisely on the nature of the process of institution (organization) 
creation: integration could denote a process of efficient organizational creation. A 
second option is to surpass the concept of institution, which might appear formal and 
lead to a straitjacket effect, and adopt instead a broader concept, that of “trust”. In our 
view, the latter option has a lot of potential to accommodate different forms of 
economic integration, while preserving the specificity of the concept, with regard to 
international cooperation. 
 
A. Integration as a process of efficient organizational creation 
 
According to the first approach, integration should be understood as a process 
of efficient organizational creation. Efficiency can be broadly defined as the 
satisfaction of the preferences of the constitutive units of an entity. The assumption is 
that any autonomous unit aims to satisfy its utility function and thus to promote 
efficiency. Autonomy refers to the decision-making capacity of the unit for the future. 
In international law, this autonomous unit refers essentially to the State. The 
preferences of these autonomous units are taken as a given. Preferences set the 
utility function of the actors and also affect their pay-off matrix.  
The different autonomous units may interact with each other. Their interaction 
takes one of the following three forms: competition (when the unit attempts to 
maximize its utility to the expense of the utility of another unit), cooperation (when the 
unit maximizes its utility jointly with another unit) or co-opetition (where the unit 
develops a mixed strategy of competition in some areas and cooperation in other 
areas with other units).  
The continuous interaction between autonomous entities requires the 
institution of some type of governance mechanisms in order to organize the 
transactions between them. The choice of a specific governance mechanism by 
these autonomous units is function of the mechanism’s comparative utility. We 
usually oppose markets to hierarchies, each forming the pole of a continuum that 
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regroups different organizational forms, what Oliver Williamson calls “hybrids”122. 
Starting with the assumption that the basic unit of our analysis is a unit capable of 
autonomy, the costs of transacting would refer to how much the autonomous unit is 
willing to trade its autonomy (decision-making capacity for the future) in order to 
obtain welfare benefits (higher satisfaction of preferences). The transactions in which 
the autonomous units collect information on the amount of welfare benefits they 
might gain, in case they relinquish some degree of their autonomy, take place in the 
context of a market. The market is perceived as an institution facilitating the 
exchange of autonomy for welfare. In international society, “the equivalent of the 
market is simply the place where states interact to cooperate on particular issues – to 
trade in power – in order to maximize their baskets of preferences”123. Joel 
Trachtman explains that “the assets traded in this international market […] are 
peculiar to states: components of power, or jurisdiction”, conceived as the 
“institutionalized exercise of power”124.  
The choice of the adequate institutional framework is function of a comparison 
between the transaction costs of using the market mechanism versus the “agency 
costs” involved in the governance of a more elaborate institution than the market125, 
such as a long-term bilateral agreement or an international regime, if we accept 
Robert Keohane’s distinction between international regimes and international 
agreements126. The occurrence of significant transaction costs might lead the 
autonomous entity, after a comparative institutional analysis which would consider 
the transaction and agency costs, to opt for an international regime instead of an 
international agreement127. As Trachtman observes, 
“there appears to be little difference in theory between this question and the 
question of subsidiarity: once an international organization exists, and has 
plenary power […] what powers should it exercise at the center, and what 
powers should it devolve to decentralised units? All other things being equal, 
the question remains, where should responsibility be lodged? Thus, the 
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transaction cost approach […] is applicable to the question of centralization or 
decentralization within an international organization”128. 
Transaction costs are significant if the complexity and the uncertainty of the 
subject matter make it difficult to write a complete treaty. Parties make agreements to 
apply and adapt broad “rules of the game” (incomplete contracts). A dispute 
resolution mechanism and significant judicial practice may reduce uncertainty and 
enhance the possibility of writing as comprehensive contracts as possible. The 
existence of a clear legal framework establishing liability for actions might facilitate 
that task. From this perspective, the choice of an international organization over an 
international agreement appears not motivated by some form of inability of states to 
satisfy their utility functions in the area covered by the agreement, for example for 
trade agreements the promotion of inter-state trade. The constitution of an 
international organization is instead the result of a comparative institutional analysis: 
“international organizations are formed to establish a set of relationships more 
efficiently than the equivalent of the market (or agreement) in international society”129. 
The outcome of the comparative institutional analysis varies depending to the issues 
arising within a given policy space. Transactions characterized by a high degree of 
asset specificity are associated with higher degrees of transfer of authority to 
international organizations. Asset specificity refers, in our context, to the degree of 
reliance on other states “to carry out their end of the bargain130”.  
Joel Trachtman provides a “matrix of institutional choice” that goes from the 
pole of regulatory competition involving externalization to majority voting within an 
international regime. Between them, he includes the intermediary categories of 
international agreements and dispute resolution (within the regime or outside it, i.e. 
arbitration)131. Each of these forms of governance relates to a specific degree of 
integration. In most circumstances, the governance mechanism operates within a 
specific cluster of issues forming part of a distinct policy space. Of course, it is 
possible to link different issues clustered separately, but that would require side-
payments (in order to modify the pay-off matrix of the other states, thus inducing 
cooperation) and eventually a revised comparative institutional analysis of the 
transaction and agency costs.  
                                                          
128
 Ibid., p. 176. 
129
  Ibid., p. 164. 
130
 Ibid., p. 167. 
131
 Ibid., p. 182. 
 30 
 
But what is the measure of efficiency if the focus is on the choice of the most 
optimal organizational structure for the accomplishment of States’ preferences? For 
Trachtman, the success of an international regime depends on “the (tautological) fact 
of political acceptance of a particular set of rules”132, which becomes the ultimate test 
of efficiency. The success of the organizational structure of dispute resolution is, 
however, more difficult to measure. One could, of course, focus on compliance. But 
how compliance would be measured if one takes a broad conception of efficiency as 
it is entailed by the concept of holistic integration? Efficiency is not limited to the 
narrow promotion of intra-community trade. If the state pursues the satisfaction of its 
utility function, any constraint on the set of preferences of the State might 
theoretically lead to an inefficient outcome. For example, if a State is found liable for 
a restriction on intra-community trade, that would automatically frustrate the specific 
value, from those included in its’ set of preferences the specific State was aiming to 
satisfy by adopting this measure. This would be unmistakably inefficient. Most often, 
the problem is accentuated by the relative fragmentation of policy areas, because of 
the distinction between the economic and the social dimensions of integration, and 
the impossibility of side-payments between areas included in the international regime 
and areas outside it.  
The main flaw of this conception of integration is, however, that the main unit 
of analysis is the State: “efficiency is defined in terms of maximization of state 
government preferences, without regard directly to the preferences of individual 
constituents”133. The citizens’ preferences are aggregated at the level of the State. 
States serve as agents of the individuals in entering into international relations134. 
Furthermore, this approach does not take into account the transformative effect of 
integration on individual preferences. The approach neglects the formation of 
individual preferences, as it focuses only on the interaction between States. States 
attempt to maximize the aggregated exogenously given individual preferences of 
their constituents. Preferences are nevertheless constantly altered by individual 
internal responses to an external (social) environment in evolution. Preferences are 
relentlessly reconstructed during this interaction. Integration constantly shapes and 
transforms this external (social environment) of the constituents of the State. The 
purpose of integration should thus not only be confined to efficiency, perceived as the 
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satisfaction of revealed/given preferences. Its aim is also to contribute to the process 
of preference-formation of the States and the constituents of the States. 
 It is well known that individual preferences may be influenced by legal norms. 
The “market building” theory of the free movement rules of the European Internal 
Market135 illustrates this process of destruction of any path-dependence on national 
rules, political processes, national economic markets, national products. Individual 
preferences cannot be an exception. Public choice theory also sheds light onto how 
the internal political processes and the aggregation of individual preferences at the 
state level might be biased by interest group politics. States do not behave, in reality, 
like unitary actors responding to international circumstances in an effort to maximize 
the relative gains of their constituents (citizens).  
 
B. Integration as a higher intensity of institutional-based trust between actors 
interacting across national boundaries 
 
An alternative conceptualization of “integration” should aim to open the black-
box of the State, by taking into consideration its constitutive elements. This will add 
an additional layer in the consideration of preferences, this time inside the State. It 
would also recognize the endogenous character of individual preferences. Our 
suggestion is to define integration as the process of building increased levels of 
“institutional-based” trust (or “system trust”) between actors interacting across 
national boundaries. This theory does not neglect the concept of the State, which is 
still present, as it sets the national boundaries defining the interactions between 
actors that are of interest for scholars of international/regional exchanges of 
jurisdiction. Interactions between these actors within the boundaries of a State are 
excluded from consideration. But the concept of the State is not as omnipresent as it 
was in the previous conceptualization of “integration”. 
Let us first define the term “actor”. Actors are not only States, but also entities 
operating inside the black-box of the State: the national legislature, judiciary, national 
regulators and central administration, firms, consumers, citizens… In short, any entity 
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that operates within the given policy space open to the type of interaction that is of 
interest counts. Each individual actor has a utility function based on a certain set of 
preferences that, in the case of “public actors” (e.g. regulators) might be 
institutionalized and in some cases explicitly provided for in their constitutive charters 
(i.e. constitutions, regulatory statutes). These actors operate within a specific (social) 
environment, which can be characterized by principal-agency relations, relations of 
competition, cooperation and co-opetition. Actors do not behave or decide as atoms 
outside the social context: their action is instead, embedded in concrete, ongoing 
systems of social relations. They dispose of the power to interact with other public or 
private actors across jurisdictions. Power relies on material and institutional 
(competence) capabilities and is subject to broad (social) environment constraints 
(interaction power). 
We turn now to the concept of “trust”. The term is employed in economics, 
organization theory and sociological literature in different ways.136 One could define 
trust as “an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate of one’s interests under 
the control of others”137. Repeated interaction forms the primary basis for trust. 
Andrew Kydd explains that  
“trust is a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting 
one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers 
exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it. In other words, to be trustworthy, 
with respect to a certain person in a certain context, is to prefer to return their 
cooperation rather than exploit them. […] Cooperation between two actors will 
be possible if the level of trust each has for the other exceeds some threshold 
specific to the situation and the actors”138. 
Increasing the intensity (level) of trust refers “to the amount of discretion trustors 
grant trustees over their interests”139.  Indeed, “cooperation is possible when the level 
of trust for the other exceeds a minimum trust threshold for each party”, which “will 
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depend on the party’s own tolerance for the risk of exploitation by the other side”140. 
Consequently,  
“to trust someone […] is to believe it relatively likely that they would prefer to 
reciprocate cooperation. To mistrust someone is to think it is relatively likely 
that they prefer to defect even if they think one will cooperate”141. 
The function of trust is to reduce uncertainty and complexity in social 
communication systems as “it allows for specific (rather than arbitrary) assumptions 
about other social actors’ future behaviour”142. It could thus be seen as a 
communicative medium reducing complexity143. Trust can take different forms: 
Luhmann distinguishes between “personal trust”, which is likely to develop when 
individual actors have frequent interactions and become thus familiar with each 
other’s personal preferences and interests and thus indifferent to the institutional 
arrangements, and “system trust”, which relies on institutions to generate trust, rather 
than on personal interaction. Institutional-based trust constitutes a more “advanced 
stage of trust production”144 as its function is to generate trust in a massive scale. But 
trust produces also risk, in particular if there is limited available information about the 
future behaviour of the trustee. Risk is an unavoidable feature of trust because trust 
can be disappointed. For example, an offer of cooperation may be exploited by free 
riding, or not be reciprocated. There are thus two inter-related conditions for trust: risk 
and interdependence between the actors. In order to minimize the risk of defect, 
actors may develop various strategies.  
An alternative way, than trust, to reduce complexity and uncertainty is the 
exercise of interaction power. Power influences “the selection of actions in the face of 
other possibilities”145. Power may not exclude risk but it may reduce it considerably: 
“a social actor who considers using power usually can refer to ‘authoritative’ and 
‘allocative’ resources, which can be deemed likely to find recognition by the 
subordinate actor”146 and thus affect its incentives to act. Hegemonic power by one 
State, or the fight for hegemony, has been a feature of many historical periods in 
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human history147. If powerful actors have few constraints on the exercise of their 
power, our capacity for trust in them is limited. Power is treated here as a relational 
construct, which connotes the degree of dependence of the actors on one another. 
Actors are frequently found in situations where they have to decide if they 
would base their interaction/communication mostly on trust or on power and the 
proportions of trust and power which should govern their relationship. 
Trust and power should not be exclusively viewed, however, as alternatives. It 
is possible that power appears in a “de-personalised” form as “system power”. 
System power can take the form of law, organization or a hierarchy which can 
develop shared meanings among the social actors and can thus “mass-produce” 
trust. Standards of expertise are the main sources of “system trust”: they are 
integrated in organizational routines that may take the form of institutions (formal or 
informal). Institutions are thus the central precondition rather than an alternative to 
“system trust”. The constitution of trust ultimately relies on the existence of strong 
institutions. As institutional-based or system trust is a condition for the efficient 
production of a high level of trust, the “trans-organizational relations can be 
reconstructed as being controlled by the patters of trust and/or power 
mechanisms”148.  
It follows from this analysis that trust is a concept that takes significance in 
situations of uncertainty over the preferences or behaviour of interdependent actors 
in a specific social system. Its function is to reduce uncertainty and thus to induce 
welfare-enhancing cooperation between them. However, trust produces also risks 
when cooperation will be exploited or not returned. This will provoke mistrust, which 
could potentially dodge welfare-enhancing activity from happening. Power or 
hegemonic control would be the other side of the coin: it is alternative to trust and 
contributes to maintain control and avoid the slippery-slope to a Hobbesian state of 
anarchy. The establishment of informal or formal institutions constitutes another 
available option in order to mitigate the risk of distrust by creating “system trust”. 
Institutions will generate trust, as long as their constituents believe that they are 
effective in preventing situations of distrust. Institutions may also require the invention 
of a common grammar that will facilitate communication between the actors, the 
existence of a regime of sanctions for instances of mistrust or of a hierarchy that will 
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exercise control over the action of the actors and will ensure that they are trustworthy 
(“system power”).   
In international trade regulation, trust can be considered as an objective 
concept describing a relationship between regulatory systems underpinned by a 
relationship between public and private actors149. The starting point is that when 
States interact, they have incomplete information about the preferences and 
objectives of their counterparts, as well as their payoffs and domestic pressures that 
are not evident to a counter-party150. As it is also the case for individual relations, 
relations between states are shaped by social networks. Actions are embedded in 
concrete, ongoing systems of social relations. Consequently, the behaviour of the 
actors is not only driven by a pure interest calculation (calculative trust) but also by 
social norms and formal and informal institutions that support the specific 
relationship.  
An important source of trust in this context would be the long history of interaction 
between these actors and their collective memory. Geographic proximity, common 
language, shared values and preferences facilitate interaction and thus build a 
certain level of “personal trust” between the different actors151. The social network 
provides a source of information but at the same time it constitutes a mechanism that 
grants importance to “reputational sanctions”152. Reputation helps to determine 
whether an actor would risk cooperating with another one153. To the extent that all 
actors are connected in a web of relations, even if there is no personal interaction, 
there is some assurance that the victim of a trust violation can take action to rectify 
the situation. The development of mutual dependence between exchange partners 
may, however, have ambivalent results as it may promote trust but also foster 
opportunistic behaviour (mistrust). 
The network of social relations to which all actors belong provides not only a 
source of information about trustworthiness but also the opportunity for each actor to 
contribute to the reputation of another one, should other actors choose to provide 
information about a possible lack of trustworthiness. This reputational cost is 
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particularly effective in closed social systems with membership, as is the European 
Union. 
There is, however, a point where “personal trust” is not sufficient to promote 
welfare-enhancing cooperation. The reason is that the more complex the relationship 
and its environment becomes, the more uncertainty is generated over the future 
actions of the actors. As actors attempt to deal with uncertainty and the risk of 
mistrust, they may find it necessary either to exercise hegemonic power, if they have 
the capacity to do so (interaction power), or to elaborate institutions that will control 
occurrences of distrust. Institutions will have as their function to generate “system 
trust” .They build on an existing level of trust, which is a necessary pre-condition for 
their existence. The reputation mechanism is one dimension of the story. Institutions 
will act as social networks implementing informal or formal sanctions to address 
mistrust. These could take the form of norms of exclusion in closed groups, of 
monitoring or of credible commitments that can be also a mechanism generating trust 
(trust-building tool). 
There are different ways credible commitments may be established. First, there is 
a possibility of a rule which would cut off options. In our context that could take the 
form of a prohibition of inefficient restrictions of interstate trade (which comes to the 
same as a prohibition of measures having a protectionist intent) or the form of a 
broader prohibition of any obstacle to intra-EU trade. 
Second, it is possible to arrange to suffer losses from a failure to act cooperatively 
(hostage taking). For example, the presumption of equivalence or mutual recognition 
shifts the burden of proof from the traders to the Member States in order to justify 
proportional restrictions of trade. This definitively increases the risk incurred by the 
regulation of the host State to be found illegal and thus sanctioned by the negative 
integration rules of the Treaty. Member States adopting regulations that are varying 
significantly from the regulations of the other Member States and thus fail to act 
cooperatively will suffer a higher likelihood of loosing the case than States that are 
closer to the mean and which have taken proportional measures. 
Third, an additional option would be to bring a third party to oversee and even 
enforce the commitments an actor made to others. In our context that would require 
the intervention of a centralized EU institution, which will monitor the process and will 
enforce sanctions that would mitigate the risks of distrust, or a decentralized network 
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that will ensure compliance through reciprocal monitoring and exclusion in case of 
non-compliance.  
What is important here is to note that the definition of the concept of 
integration as an increased level of system trust is agnostic as to (i) the formal or 
informal character of the institutions generating trust (which could be either hard law, 
or soft law or conventions); (ii) their public or private nature, (iii) the fact that 
institutions are centralized or decentralized, (iv) or even to the choice of personal 
over “institutional-based”/”system trust”. We should recognize that there is a variety 
of trust-building tools which are very context-specific and do not necessarily form part 
of a continuum. 
Turning to the example of the Internal Market, it seems that the existence of a 
high level of trust is a prerequisite for the application of the equivalence principle as 
regulators operate in a game of incomplete information. Kalypso Nicolaides observes 
that long term contracts  
“are obviously more sustainable when all parties are confident that the others 
abide by the letter and spirit of the contract. […] (S)uch confidence is based on 
the initial familiarisation and continued involvement with the foreign system, 
including through: obligations of transparency of regulatory systems, decision 
making process, and change in such system through the continued exchange 
of information between regulators; mutual monitoring that allows for the 
continued assessment of technical competence, capabilities, and efficiency as 
well as the foreign industries overall state of art in its capability to comply with 
the importing country’s requirements; and finally, since there will always 
remain some information asymmetry, there needs to be trust that the foreign 
authorities will continue to have adequate regard for public health, safety and 
environmental concern”154. 
Host State regulators often lack information on the standards and practices of the 
home State regulators, but are asked to trust the standards and practices of the 
home State, according to the principle of equivalence. Extracting information on the 
regulatory regime of the home State constitutes an effective trust-building tool. 
Transparency, sustained exchange and monitoring will increase the level of trust 
between the home and the host State. The more important these costs of information 
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are, the more attractive the harmonisation of the standards would be, in particular as 
courts are ill-suited to perform this trust-building exercise at a lower cost. This 
explains why technically complex regimes, such as financial services, transports and 
communications were harmonized before other areas in services trade. This is not to 
argue that the adoption of harmonised rules is a costless enterprise. However, an 
essential step of any negotiation process is the initially selective but gradually 
increasing exchange of information between the parties. This will avoid the costly 
quest for information on a case-by-case basis that is characteristic of the 
implementation of the principle of equivalence by courts. The process of negotiation 
will reduce uncertainty and therefore increase trust between actors. 
Action at the Union level usually aims to facilitate the process of economic 
integration by providing a negotiated common set of rules/standards. It usually 
intervenes, after it has been made clear in the implementation of the equivalence 
principle, that there are differences between the values protected by the regulatory 
regimes of the home and the host States. Action at the Union level may also 
intervene if the specific sector is subject to technically complex and detailed 
regulation that the courts are unable to cope with, in case they are required to apply 
the proportionality principle and therefore to compare the regulation of the host State 
with that of the home State. A regulatory regime may also be intrinsically complex if, 
for the accomplishment of its goals, it requires continuous supervision. The 
monitoring of technically detailed or intrinsically complex regulations involves 
important costs with respect to the acquisition of information and the implementation 
of the decision. The courts acquire this information on a case-by-case basis, without 
the benefit of prior knowledge or experience of the specific economic sector. 
Harmonisation leads to a more manageable governance regime, as the focus will 
shift from courts to national regulators (be it the legislative power, a cabinet 
department or an independent regulatory authority) that will have the means to 
perform more effectively such a monitoring function. Monitoring by national 
regulators, under the supervision of the European Commission, could provide 
important economies of scale with regards to the acquisition of specialised 
knowledge (as this will not be done now on a case-by-case basis). Regulators have 
also an important prior experience of the economic sector. National regulatory 
regimes often include an independent authority which has the task to regulate the 
specific sector. These national regulatory authorities have contributed to the 
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emergence of sector-specific harmonization standards. The involvement of 
independent administrative authorities operates as a credible commitment tool that 
the member states will not adopt protectionist strategies. For example the 
participation of independent regulatory national administrative authorities in the 
negotiation and enforcement of unified standards, as is the case with the Lamfalussy 
process in financial services or with the European regulators network in telecoms, 
ensures that other concerns than the very specific ones that are listed will be 
considered155. The harmonisation process requires nonetheless an immense effort of 
negotiation and cautious drafting of an agreement between the various actors. The 
decision to proceed to harmonisation or to rely on the operation of the equivalence 
principle will be function of the comparison of these administrative costs, at least if we 
perceive harmonisation as entirely motivated by utility. 
Trust may however be an important concern, even after the adoption of a 
harmonized standard. As the Court noted in Hedley Lomas, “(m)ember states must 
rely on trust in each other to carry out inspections on their respective territories”156. It 
is therefore important to impose on the parties additional obligations in order to 
render operational the harmonized standard. By imposing transparency 
(simplification) and an obligation of administrative cooperation between the regulatory 
authorities of the Member States the Services Directive aimed precisely to address 
this concern. 
One could identify three categories of trust relationships, on which the process 
of integration may operate. First, integration involves trust between national 
regulatory (norm-creation) actors, which would include national legislators, 
regulators, the judiciary, self-regulatory bodies, and actors at the EU level of 
governance, EU institutions. Second, it will involve trust between different national 
regulatory bodies across Member States that interact directly in the negotiation 
process or indirectly through the resolution of conflicts from the extraterritorial 
application of their regulatory standards. Third, there should be trust between 
individual (non normative) actors and the EU institutions (“trust in government”). The 
increased levels of trust between the different actors apply to all three relations (“total 
trust”). Total trust should be taken into account in order to examine the success of 
integration, not higher levels of trust in each relation. But how can we measure trust? 
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Measurement issues are certainly the most challenging aspect of this 
conception of integration. More research needs to be accomplished but there have 
already been some proposals for indicators measuring trust in international 
relations157. First it is possible to identify policies that grant other states discretion 
over outcomes previously controlled by the first. For example, a majority voting 
system qualifies as an important discretion-granting policy. Second, the existence of 
mechanisms to oversee the exercise of discretion might be also a useful indicator. 
“Methods of oversight that permit actors more leeway to make decisions are 
consistent with trusting relationships”158. For example, institutional-based trust may 
be promoted by the principle of mutual recognition as it increases the discretion of 
the home state to adopt regulatory standards that will differentiate from those of the 
host state without affecting the chances of its exports in the host state. The 
“discriminatory market access test” or a national treatment rule in the law of the 
Internal Market also recognizes more discretion to the home state than the “obstacles 
test”, as only regulations that impose costs to foreign goods that have not been 
incurred by domestic goods are subject to judicial control under the second step of 
the assessment. Finally, issues of measurement raise also important difficulties 
within the traditional views of economic integration. A variety of indicators are often 
employed, such as, from the more simple ones, the extent of free trade of goods, 
services, free movement of capital and labour, the existence of supra-national 
institutions and of monetary and fiscal coordination, to the more complex ones, such 
as the synchronization of business cycles, convergence of inflation rates and income, 
the degree of interpenetration of activities159. A common feature of all these 
methodologies is that they are all based on the theory and typology of economic 
integration of Balassa, with the correspondent emphasis on economic efficiency as 
measured by the removal of trade barriers160. These indicators assume the 
decoupling of the economic dimension from the political and social and are certainly 
inadequate if one adopts a holistic approach.  
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In contrast, if one adopts a “cybernetic” approach, which would envision 
integration as having the aim to reach a “security community” 161, either of the 
amalgamated or of the pluralistic type162, the focus would be on communication 
channels in order to create interdependence between peoples.163. This approach 
may accommodate pluralistic concerns, but its emphasis on the “use of the same or 
equivalent patterns of living, and feeling among individuals, who are members of the 
various political units that make up the security community”164 indicates that the 
principal focus is patterns of communication between people rather than between 
institutions (formal or informal). Hence, the measurement indicators suggested by 
this approach do not take into account that the process of establishing institutional-
based trust is of particular importance if one is to distinguish between the concept of 
integration and that of globalization, the latter also referring to the development of 
shared patterns of living.  
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